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A Return of the Threshing Ring? A Case
Study of Machinery and Labor-Sharing
in Midwestern Farms
Georgeanne Artz, Gregory Colson, and Roger Ginder
Machinery-sharing provides an alternative for smaller producers to obtain the efficiencies of
large farming operations and remain competitive in an increasingly concentrated agricultural
industry. This research uses a multiple case study design to examine the motivations for
sharing equipment and labor among farms and to better understand how group members
handle the transaction costs of sharing. Our case evidence finds that in addition to cost
savings, access to reliable labor is an important motivation for participating in a sharing
arrangement. Trust and frequent communication among group members helps to minimize
the transaction costs incurred from sharing.
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A number of market forces favoring larger farm
operations are driving U.S. agricultural pro-
duction toward a larger scale. Among them is
escalating input costs, especially machinery
costs. Estimated per-farm costs for tractors and
other self-propelled machinery in Midwestern
states rose 54% in real terms over the past de-
cade, from roughly $4400 per farm in 1998 to
$6800 per farm by 2008 (NASS,2009). Because
machinery is a ’’lumpy input’’ that must be
adopted in discrete amounts, expanding produc-
tion to take advantage of size economies is one
way to overcome the associated rise in fixed
costs (Johnson and Ruttan, 1994).
Although many producers have increased their
farm size, this strategy is not always appropriate
or feasible. Insufficient access to land and capital
can limit expansion. Expanding production may
increase risk as a result of larger investments in
a small set of related commodities (Roe, 2005).
Also, there are limits to farm size growth. The
weather-dependent nature of farming and the high
level of uncertainty involved in farming requires
quick decision-making by farm managers, a role
that cannot typically be delegated to workers
(Johnson and Ruttan, 1994). The prevalence of
family farms has been explained as a result of
their ability to minimize transaction costs, par-
ticularly the costs of monitoring workers (Allen
and Lueck, 2000; Valentinov, 2007).
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 2010 Southern Agricultural Economics AssociationAn alternative strategy to deal with escalating
farm machinery and equipment costs is to share
machinery.
1 Many farmers occasionally share a
piece of equipment or trade a few days labor and
it is common for neighbors to help when a farmer
is sick or injured. However, there is evidence that
a number of U.S. farmers are revisiting the prac-
tice of sharing equipment and labor with other
producers on a more routine basis. For example,
the original idea behind the agricultural leasing
firm MachineryLink was to share machinery be-
tween farmers over a geographic distance to take
advantage of differences in growing seasons
across regions (Ginder, Artz, and Colson, 2004).
Machinery-sharing rings and other farm-level
cooperative arrangements are more common in
Europe and Canada.
2 Studies of these machinery
cooperatives have documented machinery costs
savings for members as well as several related
benefits. These include access to specialized or
more efficient machinery; scale economies; an
ability to draw on the experience, labor, and ideas
of other members; the possibility of labor or task
specialization; access to volume discounts on
other inputs; risk–sharing; and environmental
benefits from reduced input use. Potential draw-
backs identified include a loss of timeliness in
field operations, decreased autonomy in decision-
making, more complex management, potential
problems with lenders and split lines of credit,
and difficulties in unwinding the arrangement
(Andersson et al., 2005; de Toro and Hansson,
2004; Gertler, 1981; Gertler and Murphy, 1987;
Groger, 1981; Harris and Fulton, 2000a, 2000b,
Nielsen, 1999; Samuelsson et al., 2008).
The research on resource-sharing arrange-
ments in the U.S. is sparse. A few University
Extension guides address machinery-sharing as
one of several options for controlling equipment
costs on the farm (for example, see Edwards,
2 0 0 1 ;W e n e s s ,2 0 0 1 ) .L a w l e s s ,C r o p p ,a n d
Harris (1996) address potential advantages and
disadvantages of various legal business structures
for multifamily dairy operations in Wisconsin but
do not analyze other aspects of these arrange-
ments. Stofferhn’s (2004) survey of North Dakota
farmers and ranchers found roughly 11% of
respondents indicating a willingness to share
equipment or labor with a neighbor but did not
document examples of the actual practice. Evi-
dence of cooperative agreements between pro-
ducers for sharing equipment is therefore
largely anecdotal and not well understood.
This research seeks to 1) describe the motiva-
tions of farmers who have entered into agreements
to share machinery and/or labor with one another;
and 2) document the ways in which these groups
have experienced and addressed the transaction
costs (timeliness, group decision-making, moral
hazard problems) of sharing. Given the limited
amount of information on machinery-sharing
groups in the U.S., this research is exploratory
in nature. We use a case study approach that
complements existing theoretical and empirical
research byprovidingmore detailed information
about how existing machinery-sharing arrange-
ments function.
The article proceeds as follows. We outline
a conceptual framework of the benefits and
costs of sharing equipment and labor between
farms in the next section. We discuss the data
collection methods next. Presentation and dis-
cussion of the internal and external economies
of scale and transaction costs uncovered in the
case studies follow. The final section concludes
with a summary of research findings.
A Conceptual Framework for
Machinery-Sharing
Participation in a machinery-sharing arrangement
involves a tradeoff between access to internal and
1Sharing equipment among farming operations is
not new. In the early 20th century, U.S. farmers often
worked together during harvest on threshing rings
(Olmstead and Rhode, 1995). Today, it is less common.
2The web site for the Machinery Ring Association
of England and Wales lists 10 member machinery
rings. Likewise, the Scottish Machinery Ring Associ-
ation claims 10 member rings. Some of these are very
large. Tayforth Machinery Ring in central Scotland
reports 800 members (www.tayforth.co.uk). A report
on the socioeconomic impacts of rural business rings
in Scotland estimates that 23% of Scottish farmers
belong to a machinery ring (SAOS, 2008). de Toro and
Hansson (2004) report 5000 members in 20 asso-
ciations in Sweden noting this is only approximately
one-fifth the level of activity in Germany. Harris and
Fulton (2000a) report more than 1000 member farms
in 47 CUMA’s (‘‘Coope ´rative d’Utilisation de Mate ´riel
Agricole—loosely translated as ‘‘cooperative for the
use of farm implements’’) in Quebec.
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action costs (Allen and Lueck, 1998; Valentinov,
2007). Internal economies of scale arise from
improvements in technological efficiency; that is
an ability to produce more output with the same
inputs or to produce the same output with fewer
inputs (Varian, 1992). Working in a group to
share machinery tends to increase the number
of acres serviced by the machinery, reducing
inputs, and average costs for a given amount of
output. Sharing can therefore make newer,
larger, more technologically advanced equipment
economical. In addition, group members can
improve labor productivity by coordinating
tasks to reduce duplication and allow for task
specialization.
External economies of scale are related to
advantages larger farms may have in accessing
inputs; obtaining and negotiating terms of
credit, storage, services; and marketing and
distribution opportunities (Johnson and Ruttan,
1994). For example, larger farms can negotiate
volume discounts on inputs (McBride, 2003).
Larger farms might be able to attract specialty
contracts that pay premiums for delivery of
greater quantities of product. Like marketing
cooperatives that obtain higher retail prices
through quality assurance, smaller farmer
groups may be able to successfully coordinate
production practices such as planting and har-
vest times to maximize quality specifications
(Sexton and Iskow, 1988).
Transaction costs related to farming in a
partnership or group include timeliness costs,
monitoring costs, and costs related to group
decision-making. Timeliness costs may occur
when a field operation cannot be performed at
the optimal time (de Toro and Hansson, 2004;
Larse ´n, 2007). Monitoring costs may arise to
ensure that other members are careful with the
shared equipment (an asset moral hazard prob-
lem) or are contributing an agreed-on number of
hours of work when labor is shared (an effort
moral hazard problem) (Allen and Lueck, 1998;
Larse ´n, 2007). In addition, collective decision-
making may be costly, particularly when the
interests of group members are not well-aligned
(Hansmann, 1996).
Allen and Lueck (1998) model the optimal
farm organization (family farm, partnership, or
corporation) as a tradeoff between gains from
task specialization and lower capital costs and
increased transaction costs, particularly moral
hazard costs.
3 They empirically test their the-
ory by examining the prevalence of organiza-
tional forms across production types (different
crops, different regions, and over time). Their
analysis shows that when production is seasonal
and there are many stages to production with
few tasks, the gains from specialization are
limited while monitoring costs are high. In
this type of production such as with grain
farming, family farms are the dominant organi-
zational form and partnerships are relatively
rare.
Larse ´n (2007) builds on Allen and Lueck’s
model to incorporate social norms, peer pres-
sure, and dynamics (repeated interaction) as
factors that might mitigate the moral hazard
costs involved in partnerships. Her survey of
640 Swedish farms found 62% participating in
some form of partnership arrangement. The
partnership farms in this study were charac-
terized by a high degree of trust and Larse ´n
concludes that the perceived moral hazard
problems were negligible.
It is important to note that both the benefits
and the costs of sharing relative to farming
alone will vary with the size and scope of the
sharing and the parties involved. Sharing only
a combine with a neighbor during harvest may
lower machinery costs while requiring some
amount of coordination between partners but is
unlikely to result in volume discounts on other
inputs or increased output prices. In contrast,
a group of many producers farming in a more
integrated manner year-round might encounter
both significantly greater benefits as well as
significantly greater coordination costs.
3In this model, the benefit of task specialization
comes from ‘‘learning by doing,’’ in which the more
a worker concentrates on a particular tas. the better he
becomes at it. Capital costs decline as the number of
partners increases for two reasons. First, self-financing
becomes easier. Second, capital will be used more
intensively and thus more efficiently. The moral hazard
problem arises as the number of partners increases
because each partner shifts effort from farm to off-farm
activities.
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We examine the tradeoffs between internal and
external economies of scale and transaction costs
in a set of 10 cases of machinery-sharing groups
primarily located in the Midwestern U.S. We
focused our study on farms with similar pro-
duction types, primarily grain production (corn,
soybeans, wheat), but chose cases to represent
variety in the degree of inter-farm cooperation
to understand how changes in the scope of sharing
affecttransaction costs. Additionally, we sought
cases in which some, if not all, members were
unrelated, believing that kinship ties might con-
found the analysis of group dynamics.
4
Case study approaches are well-suited for
gaining an in-depth understanding of current
events and for asking the types of ‘‘why’’ and
‘‘how’’ questions at the heart of this study
(Kennedy and Luzar, 1999; Sterns, Schweikhardt
and Peterson, 1998; Westgren and Zering, 1998;
Yin, 2003). Analysis of organizational forms in
secondary data like the Agricultural Resource
Management Survey is hampered by the fact
that most machinery-sharing arrangements are
informal and therefore not reflected in the
data. Given the relatively small number of
machinery sharing groups in the U.S., data
collection through a random survey of pro-
ducers mightnot identify many, ifany, groups
for analysis.
The case study approach does have its limi-
tations. We cannot calculate an incidence of
machinery-sharing,forexample.Inaddition,our
findings do not generalize to the population, but
rather to a set of theoretical propositions (Yin,
2003). The case approach taken in this study
does allow us to illustrate the range of organi-
zational forms and strategies used to share ma-
c h i n e r yi nM i d w e s t e r ng r a i nf a r m s ,t od o c u m e n t
differences across cases, and to describe any
systematic patterns in these differences.
We used a multiple case design in which the
unit of analysis was the machinery-sharing group.
Potential case study subjects were identified
through a web-based survey of University
Extension professionals in five Midwestern
states.
5Respondents were asked to identify local
groups that fit the following description: ‘‘in-
dependent farms that are participating in co-
operative arrangements to share resources for
production, yet retaining decision making sov-
ereignty over their assets and labor.’’ University
Extension staff responding to the survey identified
50 groups in five states (Iowa, Illinois, Wisconsin,
Nebraska, and Indiana) sharing equipment and/
or labor.
The majority of groups identified in the
surveyhad only twoor three members (39of 50).
Half of the groups contained no family members,
whereas 30% of the groups were comprised
solely of family members and 18% combined
family and nonfamily members. Slightly more
than half of the groups had existed for more than
5 years. Although the groups were engaged
predominantly in grain production, cooperative
arrangements among vegetable, livestock, and
fruit growers were also identified.
The web survey discovered a wide range of
cooperative arrangements. Seventy percent of
groups identified share both machinery and
labor. Fourteen percent were reported to share
only machinery, whereas 10% reportedly share
only labor. A variety of equipment types were
identified in the respondents’ comments. A
number of groups share sprayers, combines, and
harvest equipment. A few groups share equip-
ment for haying, manure hauling, seeding, and
irrigation.Some producers onlyshare the cost of
a single piece of equipment. Other groups share
whole machinery sets (e.g., combine, tractor,
planter, and sprayer) as well as labor for oper-
ating the equipment. Some others share not only
equipment and labor, but also purchase inputs
and market output as a group.
The formality of the sharing arrangements
varied from simple verbal agreements to writ-
ten contracts and formal business structures.
Over half of the groups identified have a verbal
agreement for sharing resources. Only four of
4The exception is the Spauldings case, which
consists solely of family members.
5The five states included in the survey were Iowa,
Illinois, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Wisconsin.
Attempts to solicit cooperation from the Extension
services in Minnesota and South Dakota were un-
successful at the time of the survey.
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written agreement. However, for a significant
portion of the groups (40%), the type of agree-
ment was unknown by Extension staff at the
time of the survey.
Based on theweb survey results, we developed
the two-dimensional taxonomy of cooperative
arrangements shown in Figure 1. The vertical
dimension represents the degree of cooperation,
ranging from sharing only one piece of machin-
ery to a highly integrated case in which producers
share all equipment, purchase inputs jointly, and
market at least some output together. The hori-
zontal dimension represents the degree of for-
mality of the agreement ranging from a verbal
agreement to a formal business structure.
Cases focused on examples of sharing in
Midwestern grain operations, but we attempted
to identify cases representing the spectrum of
formality in arrangements and degree of co-
operation. Selecting cases to represent this
diversity was meant to facilitate comparisons
among groups. Ten case study analyses based
on in-person interviews of producer groups
who share or have shared resources among
farms were completed between June 2004 and
January 2005. Figure 1 places these cases in
the context of our taxonomy. Potential partici-
pants were contacted by telephone and by mail
to solicit their participation in the study. With
the exception of LMC whose members were
interviewed during a visit to our university, we
conducted interviews with group members
‘‘on-site’’ in a neutral location such as a local
Extension office or hotel meeting room in their
local community. Once a meeting time and
location were agreed on, a pre-interview ques-
tionnaire was sent to the group contact request-
ing basic information about group history and
members.
We conducted group interviews with as
many group members as possible using inter-
view guides, basic outlines of the general topics,
and open-ended questions to be discussed.
6
Figure 1. Taxonomy of Possible Cooperative Arrangement Types
6The number of group members interviewed for
each case is reported in Table 1.
Artz, Colson, and Ginder: Machinery and Labor-Sharing 809Interviews lasted approximately 2 hours and
each participant received $50 to compensate
them for their time. The interviews were tape-
recorded when possible and later transcribed.
Investigators took notes during the interview and
wrote summaries of the conversations as soon as
possible after the interviews occurred. As a result
of a concern that members would not feel com-
fortable expressing negative opinions about their
arrangement in the presence of their partners, we
provided each member with an exit question-
naire to be completed at a later time and mailed
to the investigators in a stamped, addressed
envelope we provided. The exit questionnaire
solicited members’ opinions about the most neg-
ative aspects of their equipment-sharing practices
and requested any other information they felt
relevant to the study.
7 The notes of the inves-
tigators, transcripts, and completed questionnaires
served as the basis for the analysis of the case
study findings.
Results and Discussion
Table 1 and Appendix A provide a summary of
the 10 cases included in the study.
8,9 Groups
varied from sharing a single piece of equipment
to sharing entire machinery sets. The degree of
labor-sharing varied from none, in the case of a
long-distance equipment-sharing arrangement,
to a few weeks during harvest season to fully
integrated labor operations year-round. Agree-
ments between group members were of two
basic types. Groups involving fewer than four
members, regardless of the number of equipment
pieces or amount of labor shared, predominantly
had only a verbal agreement. Groups with a sig-
nificant scale and scope of operations typically
had a written contract, and most had formed
a business entity (e.g., LLC). Nine of the groups
were operating at the time of the interviews; one
group had dissolved.
Internal Economies of Scale
In nearly all cases, sharing helped groups im-
prove technical efficiency. Sharing machinery and
working together reduced per-acre equipment and
labor costs in the majority of cases. In others,
machine costs per acre remained comparable to
farming individually but allowed members access
to newer, technologically advanced machinery.
Producers reported an increased speed of opera-
tions as a result of higher-capacity machines, es-
pecially during harvest, fewer breakdowns, larger
pools of labor, and more efficient use of labor.
As one producer put it, ‘‘Three go twice as fast
as two.’’ Some producers stated that, as a result
of the cost and time savings of their cooperative
agreement, they were able to significantly ex-
pand the acreage of their crop operation or
expand the size of their livestock operation.
Somewhat surprisingly, labor, more so than
machinery costs, motivated sharing in a number
of cases. Many producers rely on family mem-
bers or retired neighbors to help during busy
times, but finding reliable, skilled, and seasonal
labor can be a challenge.
10 Working with nearby
producers offers one solution to this problem.
Several groups reported that sharing eliminated
their need to hire outside labor and improved
efficiency of operations, particularly during
harvest. Operating as a group allows for some
specialization.To theextentthat group members
can take advantage of their complementarities,
sharing can reduce the amount of individual
effort required. In several cases, producers re-
ported assuming responsibility for tasks they
enjoyed or for which they had special train-
ing or knowledge. For example, in the case of
Zimmerman and Erickson, Zimmerman takes
care ofmost machinery maintenance and repairs
because he is a mechanic by training. Erickson,
who has a commercial driver’s license, handles
much of the hauling and scheduling with their
local cooperative.
The exception was the case of Bennett, Taylor,
and Nelson. Rather than improving efficiency 7Only three members of Panhandle Farms and one
member of Progressive Farmers completed and
returned the exit questionnaire.
8The names of the individuals and organizations
have been changed to protect their confidentiality.
9More detailed versions of the case studies are
available in Artz, Edwards, and Olson (2009).
10By ‘‘skilled labor,’’ we refer to an individual with
demonstrable experience as a farm operator, including
modern farm equipment technologies. By seasonal, we
mean employed less than year-round.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Artz, Colson, and Ginder: Machinery and Labor-Sharing 811through group efforts, in this case sharing seemed
to reduce it. This failed cooperative effort was
stymied by the group’s inability to agree on
farming practices and scheduling (specifically
how, when, and by whom field work would
be done) as well as the purchase of an un-
dersized combine for their combined number
of acres.
External Economics of Scale
The main external economies of scale reported
by groups related to improved negotiating power.
Several groups reported advantages with regard
to renting land. Panhandle Farms felt their ability
to plant and harvest in a timely fashion provided
an edge in obtaining crop share leases, which are
desirable because they require less capital and
carry less financial risk than cash rent leases. The
Spaulding family noted an advantage from their
group efforts with regard to landlords. They
jointly own equipment for tile work, which al-
lows them to make improvements to their rented
farms more inexpensively than the going rate.
Another perceived advantage of group size
appears to be special treatment from machinery
dealers, input suppliers, and local elevators.
When the members of Progressive Farmers en-
countered problems with a new combine, the
manufacturer senttwo engineersdirectly totheir
farms to fix it. They felt this was a direct con-
sequence of their size. The Spauldings reported
that the local elevator occasionally extended
its hours to accommodate additional deliveries
from the group. Anderson and Parker also felt
their larger-volume purchases resulted in im-
proved service from their dealers.
In contrast, the cases provided very little ev-
idence of marketing opportunities being exploi-
ted. Only Panhandle Farms and LMC jointly
marketed any of their production. Only LMC
had attempted to coordinate production practices
to attract price premiums. LMC expanded its op-
erations into a variety of subsidiaries, including
a seed-cleaning business and a specialty crops
export venture. Parker and Anderson did suggest
that a major benefit of their partnership was
having someone to share ideas with: ‘‘Two heads
are better than one.’’ They felt the opportunity to
routinely discuss marketing strategies improved
their bottom line, although they continue to mar-
ket their crop separately.
Even joint input buying was problematic in
many cases because members maintained loy-
alties to different seed and chemical dealers.
When groups did report coordinated buying
of inputs, they generally claimed savings. For
example, the Spauldings reported that coordinated
purchases resulted in a discount of $3 per acre on
chemicals and several free bags of seed each year.
Anderson and Parker estimated a 15–20% savings
on seed and chemicals from joint purchases.
Despite the lack of coordination observed in
input buying and marketing among these groups,
if opportunities arose, these groups would be
well positioned to take advantage of them. Their
history of successfully coordinating group ma-
chinery use gives them experience managing
group dynamics other producers frequently lack.
A si nt h ec a s eo fL M C ,a n dt oal e s s e re x t e n t
Panhandle Farms and Zimmerman and Erickson,
such improved coordination may evolve over time
as the group gains experience working together.
Transaction Costs
Sharing equipment and labor involves trans-
actions costs. Members must coordinate sched-
ules, production practices, and, in some cases,
even seed varieties. They must make joint de-
cisions about what type of equipment to share,
when to trade, how to operate as a group, how
to handle repairs and regular maintenance, and a
variety of other issues. The more integrated the
operations of a group, the more likely additional
recordkeeping is required. These costs seem to
be higher in the beginning stages of the sharing
arrangement. Once groups have operated for
some time, many decisions become routine.
Timeliness Costs. Several groups reported
that they viewed their separate land holdings as
one operation for purpose of deciding which
fields to work and when. Groups tried to strike
a balance between optimal timing and fairness
to individual members. One member of the
Spauldings explained their method for making
decisions about timing in this way: ‘‘What-
ever’s ready first. I don’t think that’s ever been
a question. Sometimes we go around and do a
little bit of everybody’s. We don’t do all of one
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, November 2010 812person’s first.’’ Progressive Farmers uses a
more systematic approach. Although their land
is not adjacent, it has a general north–south
orientation. Initially, the group began planting
corn in the north working southward. They
would then retrace their path from south to
north when planting soybeans. Although this
approach seemed efficient, they felt it gave the
farmland in the middle an unfair advantage.
Now the group uses a circular planting scheme
and rotates the starting point each year. During
harvest, they combine fields as they are ready
while making sure they harvest some of each
member’s land as they go, not leaving any one
member’s land for last.
In some cases, differences in land types or
locations facilitate sharing. The heart of the long-
distance arrangement between the Fergusons
and Duncans is their ability to exploit variation
in growing seasons between their farms. Their
shared combine begins the season on Ferguson’s
North Dakota farm for small grain harvest. The
machine moves to the Duncans’ Minnesota farm
for corn and soybean harvest on September 20,
as specified in their operating agreement. This
September 20 date is flexible depending on the
harvest conditions in any given year. They try to
be flexible and communicate with each other to
work out solutions that benefit both parties.
Even neighboring farms can take advantage
of differences in their land to mitigate timeliness
issues. In Zimmerman and Erickson’s partnership,
Erickson’s property is low and consists of river
and creek bottom land, whereas Zimmerman
has mostly hill ground. Therefore, Zimmerman’s
property can usually be worked sooner than
Erickson’s. They realized that by working to-
gether they could avoid some of the timing
problems associatedwithworking bottom ground
before it was ready and working the upland more
slowly than would be desirable. In other words, if
the fields were planted as if each producer’s land
were part of a single, larger operation, the out-
come for both producers would be better.
Finally, several groups stated that taking
account of one another’s decisions about hybrids
helped reduced timeliness issues, even if they did
not make seed decisions jointly. One producer
described it this way: ‘‘He doesn’t tell me what
specific hybridsandI don’t tell himwhat specific
hybrids. We know that in general we need to
have somewhere in the neighborhood of 110 day
hybrid on this end of the stick and somewhere in
the general neighborhood of 112 days on this end
of the stick.’’
Monitoring Costs (Effort and Carefulness). In
the majority of the cases, a sense of trust and
shared values among partners rendered the ef-
fort moral hazard problem moot. Most groups
interviewed did not track hours contributed to
the group effort. In many cases, they worked
together on a daily basis and could therefore
‘‘monitor’’ each other’s efforts. Overall, state-
ments such as ‘‘You don’t ask somebody to do
something that you wouldn’t do yourself’’
reflected the sense that all partners were com-
mitted to the agreement and worked hard to
make it successful.
Two notable exceptions to this finding are
provided by the cases of the Spauldings and
Bennett, Taylor, and Nelson. At the time of the
interview, members of the Spauldings group
recognizedthey would need todevise a system to
account for members’ unequal contributions of
hours. Specifically, one of the younger members
ran a growing agriculture-related business in
addition to farming. Because the busy time for
both operations coincides, contributing his share
of hours to the farming operation in the spring
and fall was becoming increasingly difficult for
him. ‘‘He’s getting big enough now, you are
going to have to make some decisions.’’ An-
other member, a son-in-law who worked full-
time off-farm and was an inexperienced farm
equipment operator, paid $20–25 an acre rent
to help compensate for his reduced labor
contribution.
In addition to sharing equipment, an impor-
tant part of the Bennett, Taylor, and Nelson’s
agreement was shared labor. Going into the ar-
rangement, they thought they shared a similar
work ethic andview toward farming. Asa result,
they did not track hours and did not compensate
one another for their time. They encountered
problems when Bennett hired his brother to
complete falltillageonhislandwhile heworked
with the others harvesting. Because of his full-
time off-farm job, Bennett had limited time off
during harvest. Hiring his brother was the only
way he felt he could complete both his harvest
Artz, Colson, and Ginder: Machinery and Labor-Sharing 813and fall tillage before he needed to return to his
job in town. After harvest, when Nelson and
Taylor still needed to complete their fall tillage,
the fact that Bennett was not available to help
created resentment.
Another possible moral hazard problem as-
sociated with farming in a group relates to en-
suring that all members are careful with the
shared machinery. Most of the discussion about
treating equipment carefully in the groups inter-
viewed pertained to concern with hired labor
rather than partners. In fact, a benefit of sharing
was gaining access to another operator you knew
would be careful with the equipment. A quote
from one of the interviews illustrates this: ‘‘You
can find people out there but are they going to
be reliable and have the knowledge to run the
machines and the tractor?’’ Carefulness seemed
to be a criterion for choosing potential sharing
partners. ‘‘Oh there would be instances where
it wouldn’t work with certain people. Some
people just wreck stuff, I mean, you know they
are just hard on stuff. And that’s just the way it
is and wouldn’t work.’’
In the long-distance sharing case, one part-
ner mentioned carefulness as an initial concern
entering the partnership, ‘‘Maybe the second
[fear] is—are they hard on equipment, are they
gonna beat this thing to death?’’ Lacking routine
contact with one another, monitoring in these
situations is more difficult. In this case, the
group’s operating agreement detailing how they
would address repairs plus a warranty on the
shared combine helped alleviate these concerns.
Group Decision-Making. Another poten-
tially costly activity associated with sharing
is time spent on making group decisions as well
as costs associated with discrepancies between
individuals’ best interests and the best interests
of thegroup. Most groups did not have a formal
process for making group decisions. When
Anderson and Parker were asked how they
made joint decisions, Anderson replied, ‘‘It just
happens.’’ He explained that they communicate
daily to discuss any issues that arise. This was
the general approach taken by most other cases
as well. Even Panhandle Farms, one of the
larger groups interviewed with five partners,
described making decisions each morning over
coffee before starting work.
Progressive Farmers uses a more formal
voting process for making group decisions.
Like a traditional cooperative, they follow the
‘‘one member, onevote’’rulegivingeach partner
an equal voice. In other words, members with
more land do not have greater say in group de-
cisions. Although their ‘‘majority rules’’ voting
arrangement could lead to disagreements and
resentment among members, the members de-
scribed working hard to reach consensus. One
partner described some of the challenges the
group had to overcome to work effectively:
‘‘The first problem was going to be agreeing on
machinery. I didn’t think that would be a big
deal but it was. Track vehicles versus wheels.
We had some good sessions on that and they
were healthy discussions. They weren’t threat-
ening discussions, but I didn’t realize that it was
going to be that much of an issue.’’ Flexibility is
key to the group’s success. As one member put
it, ‘‘with four members, you can expect to get
your way one-fourth of the time.’’
LMC also described holding more formal
meetings to make group decisions. One of the
problems LMC encountered at the beginning
was the large amount of time devoted to meet-
ings and decision-making. To reduce the time
spentinmeetings, most information-gatheringis
delegated to members who then report to the
entire group before a vote. They reported that
many managerial tasks became ‘‘automated,’’
reducing the need for formal meetings. As a re-
sult, the group phased out regular Monday
morning group meetings and now hold only
a few formal meetings each year. The group still
meets informally almost daily as they head out
to work in their fields.
Trust.The evidence from these case studies
concurs with Larse ´n’s (2007) findings that
high levels of trust among members helps to
mitigate transaction costs in Swedish partner-
ship farms. Trust and good communication
were repeatedly cited as important factors for
success.Producersemphasizedtheimportance
of flexibility, ‘‘give and take,’’ and willingness
to be part of team. In several cases, group
members did not mind small individual losses
or decisions by the group that ran counter to
their own preferences because they felt in the
long run everything evened out. They believed
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outside it. The evidence from the failed case
of Bennett, Nelson, and Taylor supports this.
Although several factors contributed to the
failure of this group, a major cause was a lack
of trust among partners and, at times, the un-
willingness of members to consider the well-
being of the group ahead of individual interests.
For example, one member of thegroup who had
significant additional time constraints resulting
from his livestock operation was unwilling to
allow any work to begin on his fields until he
was present and able to oversee the operations.
This insistence resulted in decreased pro-
ductivity, conflicts over work hours, and per-
sonal resentment among group members.
Member Entry and Exit
The interviews revealed one particularly chal-
lenging issue for machinery and labor-sharing
groups. In several cases, groups struggled with
how to recruit and integrate new members into
the arrangement as well as how to fairly treat
members who wanted to retire from farming or
leave the group for other reasons. Three of the
cases had incorporated new members into their
groups. The Spauldings and LMC viewed their
machinery and labor-sharing group as a vehicle
for easing their sons’ transition into farming.
Stevens and Smiths brought in a young begin-
ning farmer who was unrelated, allowing him
to contribute labor to the group in exchange
for use of their machinery. Four groups, the
Duncans and Fergusons, Progressive Farmers,
Panhandle Farms, and LMC, had experienced
member exits.
Of the groups interviewed, LMC had the
most formal procedures for handling member
entry and exit. The cooperative has devised a
system that allows a new member to gradually
build equity instead of requiring a full ‘‘upfront’’
investment permitting younger farmers to join
with little capital and land of their own. LMC
markets their crop jointly and distributes profits
to members based on acreage share. For new
members, 10% of this distribution is withheld
until the new member has built up an equity
account to match, on an acre percentage basis,
that of existing members. LMC determines
equity value using prices acquired from local
dealers. In a similar fashion, LMC buys out
the equity share of exiting members over a 3- to
5-year timeframe. Spreading the payments over
several years eases the financial burden on the
remaining members and reduces the tax liability
for the departing individual. This procedure has
helped manage member transitions over LMC’s
35 years. Its membership has numbered as many
as 11 and fallen to the current number of six.
Exit of members is especially complicated
because it usually involves an abrupt withdrawal
of capital and labor resources from the group.
Even when the transition can be extended over
a 2- or 3-year period, there is likely to be a sig-
nificant negative impact on the remainder of
group. If the withdrawing member(s) have pro-
vided significant contributions of labor and
capital to the group, both the capital position of
thegroup and the internal dynamics ofthegroup
are affected. To replace such a member requires
that a new member who has similar personal
characteristics, similar capital to invest, and a
desire to participate in the group be located.
Finding new interested partners may be espe-
ciallyproblematicinveryruralareas.BothLMC
and Panhandle Farms described concerns about
the interest of younger family members: ‘‘We’ve
had kids, but they’ve all moved to the big city.
And I don’t think they’re coming back.’’ If new
members cannot be identified, the group may be
forced to dissolve and reconstitute with the
remaining members into a smaller-scale group,
but downsizing could diminish many of the
benefits of group-sharing. It is therefore impor-
tant to clearly establish the procedures for dis-
solution at the outset.
Conclusions
Cooperation at the farm level in the form of
machinery and labor-sharing is an emerging
phenomenon that may grow as machinery costs
rise and the level of technical knowledge and
skill required for production increases. The case
evidence presented here suggests several com-
mon factors that motivate and help determine
the success of farm-level sharing arrangements.
Among the cases analyzed, cooperation tended
to be motivated by an attempt to control
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seasonal labor. Once established, many groups
found other benefitsofgroup interaction tobeas
important, if not more important, than any as-
sociated cost savings. For example, the ability to
specialize, the increased pool of knowledge and
ideas, and the camaraderie enjoyed when work-
ing together were frequently cited as significant
benefits of group participation. Many of the key
success factors identified involve trust among
members: an ability to communicate effectively,
a willingness to be flexible, and a capacity to
consider group interests above individual in-
terests, at least occasionally. Trust among partners
helped minimize the transaction costs incurred
from working in a group.
This research documents the variety of dif-
ferent sharing approaches that can be effective.
Successful arrangements ranged from a fairly
uncomplicated agreement between neighbors
to jointly own and use a combine to a highly
complex organization of both production and
value-added businesses now approaching its third
generation of owners. Groups devised a variety
of methods for managing potentially challenging
aspects of group-sharing such as how to schedule
use of equipment, compensate for unequal con-
tributions of time and machinery use, and make
group decisions.
The case evidence presented suggests that
machinery- and labor-sharing arrangements have
potential as a strategy for transferring farm as-
sets between generations. Machinery-sharing can
enable retiring producers to smooth tax liabili-
ties by liquidating their equipment ownership
gradually. Beginning producers may enter farm-
ing with a reduced capital commitment, shared
risk, and a plan to build equipment ownership
over a period of time. Intergenerational sharing
may present some unique challenges as well.
Group decision-making dynamics may be more
or less difficult relative to an arrangement in
which all members are roughly the same age and
have the same experience. Farm succession plans
also frequently need to account for nonmember
interests such as how to treat non-farming sib-
lings of the beginning farmer.
Although there does appear to be potential
for successful machinery-sharing strategies, these
arrangements, particularly the most complex
ones, are clearly not for everyone. It is unlikely
that widespread adoption of these organizational
models will occur given their complicated nature.
The more costly it is to implement a new practice
in terms of time, money, and acquisition of new
skills, the more slowly adoption will proceed
(Hall and Khan, 2003).
Further research into resource-sharing is
warranted. None of the case study groups had
access to information regarding how to design
a cooperative arrangement, what the potential
costs and benefits may be, what the optimal scale
for their operation was, or how to best manage
uncertainty and problems that may arise. Addi-
tional research and related outreach materials
would prove valuable in raising producers’
awareness of resource-sharing as a possible busi-
nessstrategyandimprovingtheirunderstandingof
the benefits, risks, and mechanics of sharing
equipment and labor with other producers.
[Received February 2009; Accepted August 2010.]
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Case Studies
Johnson and Olson, two neighboring farmers in
Nebraska, began their combine- and labor-sharing
arrangement in 2003. Both farmers were faced with
a labor shortage after previous helpers (a father and
an older farmer) were forced to retire. Both were
looking to replace their aging combines that were
causing disruptions in the field as a result of break-
downs. The two farmers jointly purchased a combine
that they financed 50/50 through a local dealer. They
only harvest jointly and do not track fuel costs or
combine usage.
Stevens and Smiths operate two nonadjacent,
nearby farms in Nebraska with different cropping
systems (ridge till and no till). Their combine- and
labor-sharing arrangement began in 2002 and was
primarily motivated by labor shortages during peak
periods of the season after the loss of previous help.
They purchased jointly a new higher-capacity com-
bine (the Smiths purchased an air reel and Stevens
contributed the headers). They harvest together. Ste-
vens manages themaintenance, repairs, and insurance
for the group. Recently, the group added a beginning
farmer who contributes labor in exchange for access
to the combine.
Duncans and Fergusons operate farms in two
different states (North Dakota and Minnesota).
Seeking to reduce machinery costs and inspired by the
concept behind MachineryLink, the group formed an
LLP in 1996 to jointly own a combine. The group has
a written agreement specifying schedules for transfer
of the combine among farms, repairs, maintenance,
and storage. The group uses a rental rate to cover
combine-related expenses and to adjust for differences
in usage.
Erickson and Zimmerman, two neighboring
farmers in Iowa, have an arrangement that has evolved
from an initial custom combining agreement in 1984.
The group recognized potential synergies as a result
of natural differences in their acreage (one farmer
has upland and the other has bottomland). They
jointly own a combine, planter, sprayer, and tractor
in addition to contributing some individually owned
pieces. They pool their labor throughout the growing
season. Each specializes in some tasks (e.g., repairs
and hauling) that they personally enjoy.
Parker and Anderson operate nonadjacent
nearby farms in Iowa. After the retirement of his
father in 1997, Parker was faced with the prospect
of either hiring new labor or reducing the size of his
farm. Anderson, who had a reputation has a skilled
operator but had older equipment, was experiencing
financial difficulties after his hog operation was
decimated by disease. Parker, whose farm is larger,
owns the majority of equipment used by the part-
nership, but Anderson has begun contributing some
equipment of his own. They have jointly purchased
other pieces. The partners buy inputs together,
equally share maintenance and repair expenses, and
use custom rates to value labor contributions. Both
farmers have expanded their acreage since their
partnership began. They have also rented some land
together.
Bennett, Nelson, and Taylor, three long-time
friends in Illinois with nearby farms, began their
cooperation in 1996 motivated by the prospect of
reducing their equipment costs. Each group member
sold their individual equipment and they jointly
leased new equipment for group use. The group
disbanded 2 years later (not amicably). The group
encountered three key problems. First, they under-
estimated their equipment requirements resulting in
costly expenditures on custom combining. Second,
disagreements about work hours and timing for field
work led to ineffective pooling of labor and equip-
ment use. Third, disagreements over finances, labor
contributions, and field timing created an unpleasant
work environment.
The Spauldings, a family operation spread across
40 miles in Illinois, began as a partnership between
two brothers and has expanded to include new family
members. The group uses a combination of in-
dividually owned and jointly leased equipment. They
use a balance sheet system to track individual in-
vestments and determine ‘‘fair’’ payments. One of the
motivations for the agreement, to help new family
members enter farming, is reflected in their policy to
givebeginningsonsa2-yeargraceperiod from capital
contributions. Currently the group does not track
labor contributions, but as a result of increasingly
divergent contributions, this may change.
Progressive Farmers is a group in Iowa founded
in 1999 by four initial members seeking to increase
their efficiency in the field and gain cost-effective
access to modern equipment technologies. The
group jointly owns or leases a full set of equipment
and shares expenses on a per-acre basis. They farm
as a group and track labor contributions with all
labor tasks being valued at the same wage. To be
equitable in the timing of field work, the group has
adopted a field rotation scheme. One of the original
members left the group in 2003. This created sig-
nificant difficulties for the group attempting to
1) determine a fair compensation for the departing
member’s capital contributions; and 2) coping with
being ‘‘overequipped’’ for their reduced acreage.
Panhandle Farms was formed in Nebraska
in 1986 by six partners with no prior farming
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the elevator sold to a regional cooperative, the
partners formed an LLC to take over the farm land
management business dropped by the elevator’s
new owners. One member left the group shortly
after formation. The LLC co-own both equipment
and land. The group jointly owns all equipment
and conducts field operations together with
members specializing in specific tasks (e.g., re-
cordkeeping, mechanic work, irrigation). The
group leases approximately 85% of their land and
jointly own the remaining share. Inputs are pur-
chased in bulk and the group markets their crops
jointly.
LMC, was formed by seven families seeking a
solution to depressed grain prices and increasing
equipment costs in Saskatchewan, Canada in 1970. In
its second generation, the group jointly owns a full set
of equipment and farms as a group. The group pools
all grain and markets their crop jointly, but they retain
individual ownership of their land. Members track
their labor contributions, which are valued at a fixed
wage rate regardless of the labor task. They submit
a time sheet each month and pay or receive com-
pensation for differences in labor contributions. Over
the years, the group has concentrated on expanding
value-added enterprises (e.g., seed cleaning and ex-
port businesses) instead of expanding acreage.
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